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This paper endogenizes the interplay between innovation by a regulated ﬁrm and regulatory delay.
When product innovation costs fall over time, an extra day of regulatory delay increases time to
introduction by more than a day. In the signaling model, the ﬁrm therefore times its innovation to
communicate its private information about the marginal cost of delay to the regulator. Successful
signaling leads the regulator to reduce regulatory delay. The model places testable restrictions on
the empirical relationship between innovation delay and regulatory delay. The model is consistent
with data gathered from a large U.S. telecommunications provider.
JEL Codes:L 5 1 ,L 9 61I n t r o d u c t i o n
The potential for economic regulation to distort the incentives of the ﬁrm to innovate is well known
(e.g., Sweeney, 1981; Cabral and Riordan, 1989). Most of the literature examining regulation and
innovation focuses on the impact of the type of regulatory regime (rate of return vs. incentive
regulation, for example) or on the frequency of policy revision (the so-called “regulatory lag”).
A little-explored avenue is the eﬀect of regulatory delay on innovation.1 Regulatory delay exists
when the regulator does not allow the introduction of new products without regulatory review and
approval. Regulated ﬁrms–for example, in the telecommunications, pharmaceutical, and banking
industries2–often claim that regulatory delays are long, costly, and distort the incentives to intro-
duce new products. The impacts may also run in the other direction: the ﬁrm’s innovation decisions
may reveal information to the regulator, which might adjust regulatory delay in response. This
direction of causality–from ﬁrm’s innovation to regulator’s policy– is neglected in the literature
to my knowledge. This paper explores the relationship between regulatory delay and the timing
of the ﬁrm’s innovation. The regulator adjusts delay as the ﬁrm, through its timing of innovation,
reveals information about the cost of delay. The model I develop places testable restrictions on the
empirical relationship between innovation delay and regulatory delay, and is consistent with data
from an incumbent local exchange telephone company in the Midwest.
There are regulator-side and ﬁrm-side components to the delay between technological feasibility
of a product and its introduction to consumers. The regulator-side component is the time between
the ﬁrm’s submission of a new product to the regulator for approval and the granting of approval.
I term this component regulatory delay (the term is not intended to be pejorative; delay may
have social beneﬁts). The ﬁrm-side component is the time between the ﬁrst technologically feasible
1N o t et h a t“ r e g u l a t o r yd e l a y ”i sad i ﬀerent concept than “regulatory lag”. The former refers to delayed introduc-
tion of a new product, whereas the latter refers to the term of regulatory commitment.
2Examples of regulatory delay in telecommunications are presented in this article. In the pharmaceutical industry,
regulatory delay comes from required FDA approval of new drugs. Regulatory delay in the banking industry came
from line-of-business restrictions before deregulation.
1introduction date3 and the submission of the product to the regulator. I term the ﬁrm’s component
innovation delay. Recent history in the telecommunications industry shows that innovation and
regulatory delay tend to move in the same direction. In the data from the beginning of the 1990’s
from four Midwestern states examined here, a given new product tended to be introduced in
diﬀerent areas at very diﬀerent times. For example, products were typically introduced in Ohio
more than a year after availability in other states. By the end of the decade, product launches
were more likely to be closer together among the states, and in some cases were simultaneous. On
the other side, many state regulatory commissions have modiﬁed their policies over time to allow
products to reach the market sooner. This pattern also shows up in these data. Furthermore, not
only do innovation and regulatory delay both trend down over time, but my empirical analysis
shows that regulatory innovation delay is positively correlated with innovation delay at the level
of the individual product as well.
There are two non-exclusive explanations for the observed correlation between the ﬁrms’ and
the regulators’ behavior that I explore. It may be that state regulatory commissions exogenously
streamlined their procedures for product introductions by regulated ﬁrms, leading to shorter reg-
ulatory delay. In that case, I show that the proﬁt-maximizing response of the ﬁrm is to reduce
innovation delay. Regulatory delay reduces the opportunity cost of innovation delay for the ﬁrm by
pushing the forgone proﬁts from the new product farther into the future. When innovation costs
fall over time, regulatory delay thereby induces the ﬁrm to postpone innovation. This explanation
applies to the general trends noted, but does not address the product-speciﬁc correlation between
regulatory and innovation delay. A second explanation that does is that regulators endogenously
choose regulatory delay for an individual service based on the cost of delaying that service. I explore
the latter explanation under full and asymmetric information and ﬁnd that in both cases there is
a positive correlation between regulatory and innovation delay in equilibrium. In the asymmetric
information model, the ﬁrms hold private information about the cost of delay, and signal to the
3I.e., the ﬁrst date at which the introduction costs are less than inﬁnite.
2regulator through their innovation delay.
In the model with endogenous regulatory delay, the regulator trades oﬀ the beneﬁt of reducing
delay (quicker return on investment for the ﬁrm and earlier accrual of beneﬁts for consumers) and
the costs (loss of regulatory control, potentially lower quality of service, harm to competing ﬁrms,
and the like). These costs stem from the regulator’s “taste for delay”. A few papers in political
economy attempt to peer inside the black box of regulatory delay in other contexts (Ando, 1999;
Dwyer, Brooks and Marco, 1999). Here, I take the regulator’s preferences as exogenous and merely
note that given the lengthy regulatory delay exhibited in the data analyzed here, there must be a
strong taste for delay.
The trade-oﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of regulatory delay depends in part on the cost
that regulatory delay imposes on the ﬁrm. The cost of delay to the ﬁrm is likely to be better known
by the ﬁrm than the regulator. Unless the ﬁrm has the lowest possible delay cost, it would like to
communicate its private information to the regulator. The ﬁrm can signal its cost of delay with an
action that cannot be proﬁt a b l ym i m i c k e db yaﬁrm with diﬀerent cost. A costly action available
to the ﬁrm is innovation delay. In particular, innovating sooner than the full-information optimal
delay serves as a signal to the regulator.
The regulator must observe innovation delay for it to function as a signal. The regulator is not
likely to know when products are technologically feasible. If the ﬁrm operates in several jurisdictions
(e.g., a Bell Operating Company spanning several states), and the ﬁrm chooses to introduce new
products at diﬀering times in the various jurisdictions, each regulator learns from observing the
ﬁrm’s actions in the other jurisdictions. Once the product is introduced in one area, the regulator
in another jurisdiction knows that introduction is technologically feasible.4 The ﬁr mc a nt h e nu s e
4As long as the existing infrastructure among the jurisdictions is not too dissimilar. When looking at a single Bell
Operating Company, as in my empirical application, this is not likely to be a problem. There evidence that regulators
also use product introductions by out-of-area companies the reveal information about technoligical feasiblility. For
example, around 2000 regulators in the Ameritech states pressured the ﬁrm to speed up introduction of digital
subscriber line (DSL) service, based on observation that deployment by all the other major former Bell companies
was ahead of Ameritech.
3the time until subsequent submission for approval in the other jurisdictions as a signal.
It is important to understand the determinants of innovation delay. For example, regulators may
delay approval of a new product because of concerns about the price at which it will be oﬀered to
consumers. However, welfare gains from introducing a new product (the so-called Dupuit triangle)
are typically an order of magnitude higher than any deadweight loss from a supra-competitive price
(the Harberger triangle).5 By jointly modeling the determination of regulatory and innovation
delay, this article breaks new ground on this important issue. The earliest literature on regulation
and the timing of innovation looked at a monopolist’s incentive to innovate given a ﬁxed regulatory
regime (Braeutigam, 1979). More recent work focuses on adoption timing as entry deterrence or
accommodation under diﬀerent regulatory regimes (Riordan, 1992; Lyon and Huang, 1995), but
does not explicitly consider regulatory delay. This paper leaves aside rivalry considerations to
focus on the relationship between the regulator and the ﬁrm. There are a few empirical studies
of the impacts of regulatory delay on innovation and product introduction. Prager (1989) ﬁnds
that regulatory delay by public utility commissions raises the cost of capital for electricity ﬁrms
considering constructing new plants. Gruber and Verboven (2001) show that regulatory delay
in the granting of operating licenses to providers had a persistent eﬀect on the evolution of the
mobile telecommunications industry in Europe. Prieger (2001, 2002a, 2002b) ﬁnds that increased
regulatory delay is associated with fewer new telecommunications products introduced in several
diﬀerent contexts. Hazlett and Ford (2001) highlight the potential for ﬁrms to use regulatory delay
to raise rivals’ entry costs. These studies all focus on aspects other than asymmetric information
and signaling.6 Spiegel and Wilkie (1996) consider a model in which investment in a new technology
has signaling value in a regulated environment, although the receiver of the signal in their model
is the capital market, not the regulator.
5Hausman (1997) quantiﬁes of the high welfare cost of regulatory delay in telecommunications.
6In the only other empirical study of regulatory delay I found, Sanyal (2003) asserts that patent approval delays
detrimentally aﬀect the incentive of ﬁrms to innovate. However, the dependent variable in the estimations performed
is patent approvals and not applications. Approvals would decline as patent delays increase merely due to queuing,
even if the application rate were unchanged.
4The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I introduce a basic model of a
ﬁrm’s decision of when to introduce a new product. In Section 2.1 the regulatory environment
is taken to be exogenous, and then in Section 2.2 regulatory delay is endogenized as the second
period in a two-period game. Section 2.2 discusses both the complete information game and its
asymmetric information extension. Section 3 presents the testable implications derived from the
signaling model and introduces the data from a large incumbent local exchange telephone company
that are used to perform the tests. Testing of the predictions is carried out in Section 4. The
results show that the signaling model is consistent with the observed patterns of innovation delay
and regulatory delay in all states tested.
2 The Theoretical Model
2.1 A basic model with ﬁxed regulatory delay
I now introduce a simple model of regulated product introduction. Let time t =0represent the
p o i n ta tw h i c haﬁrm can ﬁrst feasibly introduce a given product. The ﬁrm chooses to submit the
product to the regulator for approval at time s ≥ 0, at which time it incurs ﬁxed cost F(s). F may
include the cost of development, adoption, or regulatory ﬁling. The length of innovation delay s
will be referred to as the innovation date.7 Following Riordan (1992), ﬁxed costs are assumed to be
falling over time as exogenous technological advances lower the cost of adopting the new service.
In dynamic industries such as telecommunications, it is realistic to assume that the ﬁxed costs of
innovation fall over time. I assume F0(t) < 0 and F00(t) > 0, and all functions in the model are
assumed to be continuous and twice diﬀerentiable. Falling ﬁxed costs give the ﬁrm an incentive to
delay innovation. The regulator approves the service after an examination period (i.e., regulatory
delay) of length b. Firms cannot sell and consumers cannot purchase the good until time s+b,t h e
introduction date. After introduction, the ﬁrm earns constant ﬂow proﬁto fπ(θ) per unit time,
7Whether s represents true innovation or merely adoption of existing technology (diﬀusion), the structure of the
resulting game is the same (although the interpretation of the results changes).
5where θ is a parameter known to the ﬁrm but not the regulator.8 There is a continuum of possible
types, drawn from a compact set: θ ∈ [θ−,θ+] ⊂ R. I assume that π0(θ) > 0, so larger θ might
correspond to higher demand or to lower marginal costs. Note that π is not an explicit function
of price; to focus on the strategic variable s I assume that the ﬁrm is allowed by the regulator to
charge the proﬁt-maximizing price,9 which will be a function of θ.T h eﬁrm’s discount rate is r,s o














=0⇒ rF(s∗) − F0(s∗)=e−rbπ(θ) (2)
T h el e f ts i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 2 )i st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt from postponing innovation (the reduction in
ﬁxed costs), and right side is the marginal cost from postponing innovation (the forgone proﬁt).
Thus the ﬁrm’s private information about θ can be interpreted as information about the ﬁrm’s
opportunity cost of delay.
Given the assumptions of the model, regulatory delay is unambiguously bad for the ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 ∂Π/∂b < 0. Longer regulatory delay lowers the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
From (1), ∂Π/∂b = −e−r(s+b)π(θ) < 0. There is no provision in this model for beneﬁcial
regulatory delay. An example of positive delay is for the regulator to delay introduction until
technical standards or coordination issues are resolved, which may reduce the ﬁrm’s cost or increase
demand for the service.11
8The timing of the model is similar to that of Braeutigam (1979).
9Many of the new telecommunications services introduced in the data are classed as “competitive” services and
are allowed to be freely priced by the ﬁrm.
10To guarantee s
∗ > 0,a s s u m erF(0) − F
0(0) >e
−raπ(θ)∀θ.T og u a r a n t e eﬁnite s
∗, assume that limt→∞ rF(t) −
F
0(t) ≤ 0.
11The Federal Communications Commission, for example, delayed approval of high-deﬁnition television broadcasts
for many years during the late 1980’s and 1990’s while it tested various technologies and chose a standard. The FCC
apparently believed that consumers would ultimately beneﬁt more from a high-quality product oﬀered under a single
standard, even if they had to wait an extra decade. If so, then increased demand may raise ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
6Proposition 2 ∂s∗/∂b > 0. Longer regulatory delay induces the ﬁrm to innovate later.
The proof is in the appendix. As regulatory delay increases (e.g., from bL to bH in Figure 1),
the forgone proﬁt is pushed farther into the future and its present value, which is the marginal
cost of delay, falls. Since marginal beneﬁt is decreasing, to re-equate marginal cost and marginal
beneﬁt later innovation dates are chosen by the ﬁrm. Thus there is a multiplier associated with
regulatory delay: adding a day of regulatory delay increases the time until introduction by more
than a day.
Proposition 3 ∂s∗/∂θ < 0. A higher opportunity cost of delay induces the ﬁrm to innovate
earlier.
The proof is in the appendix. The relevant picture is the same as Figure 1, where now the top
marginal cost curve corresponds to a higher θ and the bottom marginal cost curve corresponds to
al o w e rθ.A tﬁrst this result might appear counterintuitive; if regulation is “bad for the ﬁrm” why
would higher marginal costs of regulatory delay lead to earlier innovation? The answer requires
distinguishing between the direct and opportunity costs of regulation. It is the opportunity costs of
regulation that θ measures; as the forgone proﬁt from delay increases, the ﬁrm innovates earlier to
speed accrual of those proﬁts. If the direct cost of the regulatory process is included as a constant
in F, then an increase in direct cost would postpone innovation. This can be seen from Figure 1
by shifting the marginal beneﬁt of delay curve up.
2.2 A signaling model
In this section I present a signaling model of innovation and regulation that allows regulatory delay
to be chosen after the ﬁrm chooses its innovation date. Here, regulatory delay is split into an
exogenous component, ¯ a ≥ 0, and an endogenous component a ≥− ¯ a. Structural delay ¯ a is taken
as ﬁxed before the game begins, and represents the delay that any service expects to go through.
Structural delay may include time spent getting on the regulator’s docket, waiting for a monthly
7review meeting, and mandatory examination periods. In the empirical models to follow, structural
delay is taken to be exogenous when considering any single innovation. The part of regulatory
delay speciﬁct ot h es e r v i c ei nq u e s t i o ni sa. I do not rule out the possibility that the regulator
sets a<0 and chooses to expedite approval. Thus the regulator can choose total regulatory delay
b =¯ a + a to be any positive length The role of ¯ a in the model is to provide a link to the empirical
application, in which structural, service-inspeciﬁc delay clearly is a salient feature of the regulatory
regimes examined.
The ﬁrm is the ﬁrst mover in the game, and chooses s as in the basic model above, taking ¯ a as
predetermined. The regulator subsequently observes the ﬁrm’s action s, updates its beliefs about
the ﬁrm’s type θ,a n dc h o o s e sd e l a ya.12 Because the regulator makes its decision after the ﬁrm’s,
the ﬁrm can signal its type to inﬂuence regulatory delay.
The regulator’s objective function may represent either social welfare (the “benevolent dictator”
framework) or the utility function of the regulator (the “economic theory of regulation” approach
to regulation (Peltzman, 1976)). Take utility at time s when the regulator believes the ﬁrm to be
of type ˆ θ to be
U(ˆ θ,a)=W(b,ˆ θ)+V (a) (3)
The ﬁrst part of the utility function, W, comes from the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm and the consumers’
surplus. In the simplest case, W is the sum of the present discounted value of total welfare. Other
transformations of proﬁt and consumers’ surplus are allowed, but it is assumed that ∂W/∂b < 0,
∂W/∂ˆ θ>0, ∂2W/∂b2 > 0,a n d∂2W/∂b∂ˆ θ<0. These assumptions are consistent with W =
Π + CS,w h e r eCS is the present discounted value of a constant surplus ﬂow α(θ) with α0(θ) > 0.
The ﬁrm’s type aﬀects CS at least indirectly because the monopoly prices charged are a function
of θ.I fθ represents a demand parameter, then θ will also have a direct impact on CS.
Crucial to the model is V , the beneﬁt to the regulator from regulatory delay, with V 0 > 0 and
12The game assumes that the regulator cannot commit to a policy a before the ﬁrm moves. Lack of commitment
is a common assumption in regulatory games (outside of the mechanism design literature). See Spiegel and Spulber
(1997) for a discussion of why regulatory commitment is not a realistic assumption.
8V 00 < 0. The interpretation of V varies with the interpretation of the regulator’s objective. In a
benevolent dictator setting, V may represent beneﬁts not reﬂected in CS as deﬁned above from
higher quality or lower level of externalities that may result from regulatory delay.13 In a political
economy setting, V might represent a preference for exercising authority or direct or indirect payoﬀs
to the regulator from the ﬁrm’s rivals (although any such rivals are not modeled explicitly here).
This “taste for delay” in the model, although ad hoc, is clearly realistic. Examination of the data
below shows that regulatory delay is often quite lengthy in the real world, and therefore regulators
must perceive there to be beneﬁts of some sort to delay.
Finally, it is required that the concavity of V be great enough in magnitude, so that ∂2U(a)/∂a2
< 0. This assumption, for technical convenience, assures that the relevant single-crossing condition
holds. Note ﬁnally that U is forward looking or “memoryless” in the sense that s does not aﬀect U.
This assumption means the regulator treats innovation delay as a bygone by the time its decision
is to be made, and simpliﬁes some of the results but is not intrinsic to the argument.
Solution concept I restrict focus in this Spence-type signaling game to cases of successful sig-
naling: sequential separating equilibria. As will be shown, equilibrium in the model is unique and
consists of pure strategies, and so I do not discuss mixed strategies here. Equilibrium consists of the
ﬁrm’s one-to-one strategy σ(θ) for s, and the regulator’s strategy α(ˆ θ,s) for a, and the regulator’s
posterior beliefs ˆ θ about θ such that
• σ(θ) maximizes Π(θ,s,¯ a + a) given the ﬁrm’s correct expectation that a = α(θ,s),
• α(ˆ θ) maximizes U(ˆ θ,a) given the posterior beliefs and the regulator’s correct expectation
that s = σ(ˆ θ),a n d
13If delay represents the time taken by the ﬁrm to bring the product up to a regulatory quality standard, then
longer delays may increase product quality. If delay represents time taken by the regulator to investigate safety or
privacy concerns (e.g., caller ID or caller ID blocking), then longer delays may decrease externalities. In these cases,
CS is read as surplus conditional on a ﬁxed level of quality or externalities, and all beneﬁts of delay are subsumed
in V .
9• ˆ θ = θ on the equilibrium path.14
With continuous types Mailath (1987) shows that a unique separating equilibrium exists if
certain technical conditions are met, which are discussed below and in the appendix.
The regulator’s strategy Because equilibrium is sequentially rational, we may use backward
induction to solve the game. The regulator will choose a as
α(ˆ θ) = argmax
a
U(ˆ θ,a) (4)
when it believes the ﬁrm is type ˆ θ. Assuming an interior solution (α>−¯ a), the optimal choice of
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b=¯ a+α
(5)
The expression shows that α ensures that the marginal beneﬁt of delay for the regulator (on the left)
equals the regulator’s marginal cost of delay (on the right). Of central interest for characterizing










which, by the assumptions above, is negative. Figure 2 shows a typical case. The implication is
that the ﬁrm knows it will receive lower regulatory delay the higher the regulator thinks θ is. Thus
the worst belief the regulator can hold, from the ﬁrm’s point of view, is that θ = θ−.A l lﬁrm types
other than θ− therefore wish to signal to the regulator to avoid the worst outcome, α(θ−).
The ﬁrm’s strategy Following Mailath (1987), deﬁne the ﬁrm’s concentrated proﬁt function as
˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)=Π(θ,s,¯ a + α(ˆ θ)) (7)
14More formally, strategies and beliefs are sequentially rational and consistent in the sense of Kreps and Wilson
(1982). Sequential equilibrium in this game may impose more restrictions on play oﬀ the equilibrium path than does
the more familiar perfect Bayesian equilibrium, because there are more than two types (see Thm. 8.2 of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991)).
10The function is concentrated in the sense that the optimal action of the regulator is incorporated
into ˜ Π.I ti su s e f u lt on o t et h a ti nt h i sm o d e l˜ Π satisﬁes a single crossing condition for θ:
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂s
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂ˆ θ
is strictly monotonically decreasing in θ.( 8 )
T h es i n g l ec r o s s i n gc o n d i t i o nf o rθ, proved in the appendix, means that strengthening the signal is
costlier for ﬁrms with higher costs of delay. The condition implies that the ﬁrm’s strategy will be
monotone in θ. Condition (8) holds without any additional assumptions needed.
If the ﬁrm’s type were observable to the regulator, then the ﬁrm would choose its optimal
innovation delay as
s∗ = τ(θ) = argmax
s
˜ Π(θ,θ,s) (9)
The function τ is the full-information benchmark strategy for innovation delay.
Looking ahead to the regulator’s policy α(ˆ θ),t h eﬁrm wishes to signal its type when doing
so will cause the regulator to reduce regulatory delay from α(θ−).T h u sτ(θ)=σ(θ),w h e r eσ is
the ﬁrm’s signaling strategy for s,o n l ya tθ = θ−. The type with the lowest cost of delay has no
incentive to signal, which provides an initial value condition needed to solve for the equilibrium
strategy below.
If σ(θ) is part of a separating equilibrium, it must be one-to-one and be incentive compatible.
Incentive compatibility requires that the ﬁrm maximize ˜ Π recognizing that the regulator will (in
equilibrium) correctly infer its type: if the ﬁrm chooses delay s, the regulator will correctly believe
that the ﬁrm’s type is σ−1(s). Mathematically, incentive compatibility requires that
σ(θ) = argmax s∈σ([θ−,θ+])˜ Π(θ,σ−1(s),s) (10)
Mailath (1987) shows that under condition (8) and other regularity conditions (see the appendix) a
unique, continuous, strictly monotonic pure strategy σ(θ) exists. The ﬁrm’s strategy may be found




∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂ˆ θ
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂s




Given the assumptions of the model, dσ/dθ < 0. The derivative of σ at θ− approaches inﬁnity,
because the denominator of (11) vanishes at θ− since s = τ(θ−) by equation (12) and τ maximizes
˜ Π from (9). Thus, since τ has ﬁnite derivative at that point, σ is below τ to the right of θ− (this
is formalized as Proposition 7 in the appendix). In Figure 3, which shows a typical case, the ﬁrm’s
full information strategy is the heavy line and the signaling strategy is the lighter line below. The
economic interpretation of the ﬁrm’s behavior at θ− is that types marginally higher than θ− must
decrease innovation delay a lot to diﬀerentiate themselves from the worst type, θ−. The derivative
of σ, although still negative, is not as large for higher types. Thus the additional decrease in the
ﬁrm’s innovation delay needed to signal its type decreases as θ increases. In all cases, however, the
innovation delay chosen by the ﬁrm is less than that chosen in the full information case. This is
the cost of signaling for the ﬁrm. As one expects in a signaling model, the ﬁr me a r n sl e s sp r o ﬁt
compared to the full information case. Note, however, that consumers beneﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm’s
private information. Because the ﬁrm signals by reducing its innovation delay, consumers receive
the new service earlier than in the full information case.
Before concluding the theoretical exposition, I highlight three empirically testable predictions
of the model. The ﬁrst, that longer structural regulatory delay induces the ﬁrm to innovate later,
requires an additional assumption. Given θ,d e ﬁne the single-crossing condition for ¯ a to be:
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂s
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂ˆ θ
is strictly monotonically decreasing in ¯ a. (13)
Condition (13) means that in the family of signaling games parameterized by ¯ a, for a given type the
isoproﬁt curves of the ﬁrm in (ˆ θ,s)-space for two diﬀerent values of structural regulatory delay ¯ a
cross no more than once. The following proposition states that when the single-crossing condition
12for ¯ a is satisﬁed, we have a result in the signaling game similar to Proposition 2 for exogenous
regulatory delay. This single-crossing condition is not implied by the assumptions made so far,
because it places restrictions on third-order derivatives of U.15
Proposition 4 If the single-crossing condition for ¯ a (13) is satisﬁed, then ∂σ(θ)/∂¯ a>0.L o n g e r
structural regulatory delay induces the ﬁrm to innovate later.
Condition (13) ensures that the single crossing condition of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) is
satisﬁed (see their Theorem 3). Since s is scalar, ˜ Π is supermodular in s.16 Then Theorem 4 of
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) proves the proposition.
The second empirically testable result is that innovation delay and discretionary regulatory
delay will be correlated, in the following sense:
Proposition 5 da/ds > 0 in equilibrium. Regulatory delay is positively associated with innovation
delay in the equilibrium of the signaling model.
Note that, in anticipation of the empirical speciﬁcation below, regulatory delay is described as
a function of innovation delay. The proposition follows formally from the theory of supermodular
games.17 However, in the present context the proposition may be seen to follow directly from the
fact that s and a are both decreasing in the ﬁrm’s type. Thus, in equilibrium, low types lead to
high regulatory and innovation delay, and high types lead to low innovative and regulatory delay,
so that (ceteris paribus) s and a would appear to move together in a sample of observations on the
outcome of this one-shot game.
The third empirically testable result is a reﬁnement of the second. In addition to positive asso-
ciation between innovation delay and regulatory delay, the model also predicts that the functional
relationship is concave:
15To see this, note that from (25), (∂˜ Π/∂s)/(∂˜ Π/∂ˆ θ) involves second order derivatives of U.
16See Topkis (1998), example 2.6.2.a.
17See, e.g., Topkis (1998), Lemma 4.2.2.
13Proposition 6 da/ds i sd e c r e a s i n gi nan e i g h b o r h o o dt ot h el e f to fα(θ−) in equilibrium. Regula-
tory delay is concave in innovation delay in the equilibrium of the signaling model, at least in that
region.
The proof is in the appendix. The proposition states that marginal increases in innovation
delay prompt diminishing marginal increases in regulatory delay, as can be readily seen in Figure
4. Concavity of regulatory delay is thus a necessary implication of signaling, and may be used
to distinguish signaling from full-information behavior, since concavity need not hold in the full-
information case.
2.3 An example
Before turning to the empirical tests, consider the following example to illustrate the results of the
signaling model. Assume these functional forms




which satisfy the needed conditions given above, including the single crossing condition (13). The
regulator’s best response regulatory delay is found from (5) as




and the ﬁrm’s best response innovation delay under full information is found from (9) as
τ(θ)=2 r¯ a +l n
r +1
rθ2 (19)






(1 + r)e−s − rθ2 exp(−2r¯ a)
(20)
σ(θ−)=τ(θ−) (21)
This initial value problem does not have an analytic solution, but is readily solved by numerical
methods. For example, set θ− =0 .1, θ+ =1 , ¯ a =2 0 ,a n dr =0 .1. The regulator’s strategy for
this case is the one depicted in Figure 2, the ﬁrm’s full information (the heavy line) and signaling
strategies are the ones depicted in Figure 3, and the equilibrium relationship between regulatory
and innovation delay is the one shown in Figure 4. The relationship between a and s for the full
information case is linear in this example:
α(τ−1(s)) =
s +l nr − ln(r +1 )
2r
(22)
For the signaling case, in the function α(σ−1(s)) a given regulatory delay results in longer regulatory
delay, compared with the full information case. This follows directly from Figure 3, because
regulatory delay depends only on the type of the ﬁrm, and a given type signals with an s shorter
than it would like to absent signaling. Note that the sign of the relationship between regulatory and
innovation delay is positive in both the full information and signaling cases. However, Proposition
6 applies only to the signaling model: α(σ−1(s)) is concave but α(τ−1(s)) is not. Therefore, the
sign of correlation between regulatory and innovation delay may be used to distinguish strategic
from non-strategic or random behavior, but concavity must be tested to distinguish between the
full information and signaling cases.
3 Data and Discussion of the Tests
The theoretical model places restrictions on the relationship between regulatory and innovation
delay. First, from Proposition 2 or 4, the ﬁrm’s innovation delay rises as structural regulatory
15delay rises. This prediction applies to average behavior within a regulatory regime, and implies
that innovation delay is longer in regimes with longer structural delay. Second, from Proposition
(5) endogenous, discretionary regulatory delay rises with innovation delay. Proposition 6 further
asserts that regulatory delay is concave in innovation delay. The latter two predictions pertain to
the behavior of the regulator and the ﬁrm concerning a speciﬁc new product introduction. Note
that tests of these three predictions are non-parametric, in the sense that the tests depend only on
the sign or shape of the correlation between the observed regulatory and innovation delay, and no
speciﬁc functional forms need be assumed for π, W,o rV .
Data were collected on innovation and introduction dates for telecommunications services in-
troduced in the 1990’s by Ameritech in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin.18 Ameritech, one
of the Bell regional holding companies and later acquired by SBC, is the dominant local exchange
company in each of these states, and its intrastate activities are regulated by the state commissions.
Introduction of a new service required petitioning the public utility commission in each state; the
s e r v i c ec o u l dn o tb eo ﬀered to subscribers until regulatory approval was granted. Examples of
the residential and business services in the data are new voice mail features, virtual networking
services, and high-speed transmission services. The data cover the span 1991 through 1999, which
comprises three regulatory periods.19 In the ﬁrst period, 1991 through mid 1994, Ameritech was
under some form of rate of return regulation in each state. Following this ﬁrst period, each state
switched to some form of incentive regulation. After three years of the new regulation, in 1997 the
regimes were reviewed in at least some of these states.20 Thus the regulators (or state legislatures)
had three opportunities to set their policy concerning structural regulatory delay (i.e., to choose ¯ a).
Preliminary statistical work revealed that the latter two periods were indistinguishable in terms of
average innovation and regulatory delay, and so I collapse the years 1994—1999 into a single period
18The data are from the tariﬀ ﬁling logs of the company and the state commissions. Supplemental information
was culled from the actual state tariﬀs where needed.
19The data for Ohio are complete only for years 1994-1999.
20See Roycroft (1999) for more information on the regulatory regimes.
16of incentive regulation in the empirical models and refer to it as Period 2 in the tables.
The ﬁrst diﬃculty for the empirical investigation is measuring s, time between potential and
actual innovation (“innovation delay”). I take the date at which a service is ﬁrst introduced in any of
these states or in the FCC’s access tariﬀ to be t =0 , and then measure s for the other states relative
to the ﬁrst state’s innovation date. This eﬀectively underestimates true innovation delay: the true
time 0 must be weakly before the observed ﬁrst “innovation” under this deﬁnition. However, time
elapsed before the ﬁrst tariﬃng is not observed by the regulator and cannot serve as a signal. Thus
my measurement of s corresponds to the useful part (for signaling) of innovation delay, and therefore
corresponds to s as used in the model.21 Applying the single-ﬁrm, single-regulator theoretical model
requires the assumption that there are no strategic interactions among jurisdictions. To be included
in the data set, a new service had to be introduced in at least two states. One hundred fourteen
services were introduced in at least two states, generating 349 observations. Summary statistics
for the observations on innovation delay are in Table 1. Regulatory delay, a,i sm e a s u r e da st h e
time from the ﬁrst tariﬀ ﬁling submission date to the approval date of the last tariﬀ ﬁling for the
service.22 Regulatory delay data is not available for Ohio. Summary statistics for regulatory delay
are in Table 2.
What is the power of tests based on these predictions to distinguish between the signaling model
and alternative explanations? If the ﬁrm and the regulator choose delay to maximize objectives
other than those described above, then there is no particular reason to expect innovation and
regulatory delay to be positively correlated. Similarly, if innovation and regulatory delay vary across
regulatory regimes or individual products only in response to factors orthogonal to the variables in
the model, there will be no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between s and ¯ a (or a). However,
unobserved heterogeneity among regimes or products may induce correlation between innovation
21The one caveat is that Ameritech also operates in Michigan. New services were eﬀectively deregulated in Michigan
and were not tariﬀed. It is thus unclear how observable introductions in Michigan were to regulators in the other
states.
22Some services had multiple tariﬀ ﬁlings and withdrawals before approval was granted.
17and regulatory delay in other cases. For example, if proﬁt opportunities are systematically higher in
one regime than another, and the ﬁrst regime also happens to have lower structural regulatory delay,
then we may observe spurious positive correlation between s and ¯ a. In the empirical application,
therefore, I control for variables that aﬀect average proﬁt, cost, and consumers’ surplus (size,
density, and wealth of the market, etc.) in the regulatory regime. Controlling for diﬀerences in
proﬁt, cost, and consumers’ surplus isolates the impact of regulatory delay on innovation.
At the product-speciﬁc level, we may observe spurious positive correlation between innovation
delay and discretionary regulatory delay if services diﬀer in the complexity of implementation. If
so, the ﬁrm may delay ﬁling for approval as it works out technical issues, and the regulator may
delay approval as it reviews the complex issues raised. Correlation between s and a would be
positive, but not for any reason coming from the theoretical model. Controlling for the complexity
of a new service oﬀering in the empirical work is diﬃcult. In related work, Prieger (2002b)u s e s
the number of pages in the tariﬀ ﬁling to proxy complexity, but this variable is not available in the
present data. Instead, I proxy complexity with the rank of the introduction of a service among the
various states. The idea behind using the order of introduction to reveal complexity of product
implementation is based on learning by doing. Ameritech gains experience each time a particular
service is introduced in another state. Thus (on average) the ﬁrst introduction may be the most
complex. Similarly, regulators in subsequent states can learn from the experience of regulators in
previous states, as the examine the issues that were raised and their resolution during previous
approval processes. Thus the complexity of the regulatory approval process should also decrease
in subsequent states. Of course, the rank of a state in the order of introduction is not unrelated
to innovation delay: longer delay in a state increases the likelihood that introduction is later than
in other states. However, in estimations including the rank of introduction as a control, I already
control directly for innovation delay. The rank therefore communicates extra information about
complexity not captured by innovation delay. The idea: given two distinct services with equal
innovation delay, regulatory approval is more complex on average for a novel service than for a
18service already introduced elsewhere in neighboring jurisdictions.
Finally, note that the ﬁrst two predictions hold in the model for both the full-information
and signaling cases, and cannot be used to distinguish between these alternatives. However, the
condition of concavity implied by Proposition 6 is necessary for the signaling model but not the full
information model (as may be seen from Figure 4). Thus rejecting concavity of regulatory delay
in innovation delay would reject the signaling model but not the full information model.
4R e s u l t s o f t h e E m p i r i c a l T e s t s
The goal of the empirical work is to test the predictions from the signaling model. To this end, I
ﬁrst examine the relationship between innovation delay and structural regulatory delay and then
look at the relationship between discretionary regulatory delay and innovation delay.
Estimating how innovation delay varies with structural regulatory delay. Structural
regulatory delay varies greatly over time in the data. The institutional changes that took place
in 1994 in each state expedited approval for new services. Streamlining the regulatory approval
process received special attention in the new incentive regulation plans. In Illinois, the legislature
mandated that the regulatory commission evaluate whether an alternative regulatory plan would
“reduce regulatory delay and costs over time”.23 Under the new regulation, termed Advantage
Illinois, new services deemed competitive were allowed to be introduced on one day’s notice, and
many more services were classiﬁed as competitive after the regulatory change. In Indiana, all
new services were allowed to be introduced on one day’s notice under the “Opportunity Indiana”
alternative regulatory plan, down from at least a month of regulatory delay before the new plan.
In Ohio, the legislature explicitly noted that “Alternative methods [of regulation] may include,
but are not limited to, methods that...minimize the costs and time expended in the regulatory
23See § 220 Illinois Compiled Statutes, sec. 13-506.1.
19process....”24 In response, the commission eﬀectively detariﬀed competitive services and allowed
them to be introduced with essentially no regulatory scrutiny. In Wisconsin, the commission
revised its procedures to ensure that approval for new services would be granted after 10 days
unless suspended for investigation, down from about a month under rate of return regulation. The
intent of the new regulation in each state was to ensure that structural regulatory delay be smaller
in period 2 under the alternative regulatory schemes.
Another source of evidence is to examine the data themselves. Table 2 shows that the mean
a n dm e d i a nt a r i ﬀ approval delay dropped in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin (no data are available
for Ohio). Results from estimations lead to similar conclusions. I estimate the entire distribution
of regulatory delay in the two periods via the Kaplan-Meier (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980) non-
parametric method (Figure 6). The ﬁgure presents the survival curves (deﬁned to be 1 − CDF)
for regulatory delay and indicates that delay in period 2 stochastically dominates period 1 delay.
Estimated means and medians from the curves are in Table 5. Mean and median regulatory delay
is smaller in period 2 in each state. The conﬁdence intervals for the median delay in periods 1 and
2 are non-overlapping in all states. In the next section I discuss further evidence from regressions
that structural delay decreased in period 2.
How did Ameritech respond to the reduced structural delay? From the raw data in Table 2
it is clear that mean and median innovation delay dropped substantially from period 1 to period
2. The estimated survival curves in Figure 5 reveal convincing evidence that period 2 innovation
delay stochastically dominates period 1 delay. Estimated means and medians from the curves are
in Table 3, and conﬁrm the visual evidence from the curves: the mean and median innovation
delay is smaller in each state in period 2. Although the conﬁdence intervals for the medians are
non-overlapping only in Indiana and Wisconsin, if a slightly higher quantile is chosen, e.g. the 0.6
quantile (which corresponds to the ordinate 0.4 on the survival curves), the conﬁdence intervals
are non-overlapping in all states. Furthermore, a log-rank test formally rejects the hypothesis that
24See Ohio Revised Code § 4927.04.
20the two distributions are the same.25 Thus it appears that innovation delay fell in each state in
period 2, conﬁrming the prediction of the model that innovation delay moves in the same direction
as structural regulatory delay.
Since the nonparametric method does not allow covariates, I turn next to a semiparametric
model to control for economic conditions and other factors that may change over time and inﬂuence
the ﬁrm’s behavior apart from the strategic considerations that I want to isolate. Estimates from a








where λ0 is an arbitrary, unspeciﬁed baseline hazard and xi is a vector of covariates for spell
i.26 Positive coeﬃcients for β increase the hazard and therefore decrease mean duration. The
ﬁrst estimation replicates the ﬁnding from the survival curve estimation. When only ﬁxed eﬀects
are included–state dummies, state-speciﬁc indicators for period 2 (STATE:reg change), and an
indicator that delay is calculated from the federal access tariﬀ–the coeﬃcients for the regulatory
change all indicate shorter delay times in period 2 (see Estimation I1 in Table 4). Also reported for
each estimation are the χ2 statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients and Grambsch and
Therneau’s (1994) T(G) statistic. The latter is for a test of the proportional hazards assumption
of the Cox model. In all estimations, the coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant and the proportional
hazards assumption is not rejected.
Estimation I2 is a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation, in which stratiﬁcation by state replaces the state
dummy variables, which allows the baseline hazard to vary without restriction across states. The
coeﬃcients again indicate shorter delay times in period 2, although the coeﬃcient for Illinois loses
signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding generally persists when state-level economic covariates are added in
Estimation I3 to replace the state dummy variables and stratiﬁcation. The new variables are
25The test, also know as the Mantel-Haenszel test, has a p-value less than 10
−11.
26The Cox (1972; 1975) model uses a
√
N-consistent partial likelihood method to estimate β.
21per capita income (PCI), the number of access lines in each state (a measure of market size),
population density (denser areas are cheaper to serve per subscriber due to ﬁxed costs), and lagged
telecommunications industry patents.27 These covariates are allowed to evolve over the course
of a duration. Adding these variables does not remove the conclusion that innovation delay fell
in period 2 except, again, for Illinois, for which the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. Taken together,
then, the evidence from all estimations indicates that innovation delay is positively associated with
structural regulatory delay in accordance with Propositions 2 and 4, except possibly in Illinois.
Estimating how service-speciﬁc regulatory delay varies with innovation delay. To ex-
amine how discretionary regulatory delay a changes as innovation delay s varies, I perform Cox
estimations for regulatory delay where innovation delay for the service is included as a regressor.
By including innovation delay as a regressor, I assume it is exogenous (or predetermined) with
respect to regulatory delay. The assumption of exogeneity may not hold if observed regulatory and
innovation delay are jointly determined by behind-the-scenes negotiations between the ﬁrm and the
regulator. For example, the ﬁrm could agree to not submit a product for approval until the reg-
ulator gathers information on the relevant issues, shortening observed regulatory delay. However,
such maneuvering would induce negative correlation between regulatory and innovation delay, the
opposite of what I ﬁnd.
To anticipate the concavity test of Proposition 6, innovation delay enters the regression func-
tion non-linearly. I include an indicator variable for zero innovation delay, because 35% of the
observations are truncated at zero. For positive innovation delay, I include a two-part spline with
the knot at the median innovation delay.28 Estimation R1 presented in Table 6 includes innovation
delay only (as in Estimation I2, the sample is stratiﬁed by state). The coeﬃcients on the state
dummy variables for period 2 indicate increased hazards and shorter regulatory delay time in each
27The Bell Operating Companies take out few patents themselves, and typically create new services from underlying
technology patented by others.
28If a second knot is added at the third quartile, the slope coeﬃcient for the third piece of the spline does not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from the second piece.
22state during the second regulatory period. In this and all other estimations, the coeﬃcients for
Indiana and Wisconsin are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, but those for Illinois are not.
Since these coeﬃcients capture average regulatory delay in the state and period when controlling
for service-speciﬁc innovation delay, this is further evidence that structural delay ¯ a decreased in
period 2.
More interesting in the estimation, however, are the results for innovation delay. Proposition 5
states that there must be a positive relationship between a and s.T h ec o e ﬃcients for the innovation
delay spline are negative in all speciﬁcations in Table 6, implying that the hazard rate for regulatory
delay decreases (and average delay increases) as innovation delay increases. For estimation R1, the
estimates imply that if innovation delay rises from its mean value by one standard deviation, then
regulatory delay increases by 8.0 days. I discuss the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimates in the
next section. This result is robust to various cha n g e si nt h ec o n t r o l su s e d . I ne s t i m a t i o nR 2i n
Table 6, the stratiﬁcation by state is replaced with state-speciﬁc political economy variables used
in other studies of regulatory change (Donald and Sappington, 1997): the log annual budget of
the regulatory authority, an indicator for Republican control of both houses of the state legislature
and a Republican governor (Republican), and the average value of Republican from 1984 up to
the previous year (Republican history).29 The coeﬃcients for innovation delay change little from
estimation R1.
In estimations R3 and R4, the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations are repeated including the observation’s
rank in the order of introduction of that particular service across the states.30 As discussed above,
after controlling for innovation delay, the rank proxies the unobserved complexity of the service.
One expects that holding the length of innovation delay constant, services introduced in later states
29The other political economy variable used in Donald and Sappington (1997), an indicator for elected public utility
commissioners, can not be used here because commissioners are not elected in any state. Other variables I explored
included the size of the PUC staﬀ and the political composition of the legislature and governor’s oﬃce separately;
none of these was signiﬁcant.
30Estimation R4 is stratiﬁed by state, because when not the proportional hazard assumption is rejected by the
T(G) statistic.
23are less complex and should be approved quicker. This is indeed what estimations 3 and 4 reveal
in Table 6: the hazard rate increases monotonically with the introduction order of the service,
implying that the average regulatory delay time decreases as the rank increases. More importantly,
for the purposes of testing the theoretical model, the coeﬃcients on the innovation delay variables
remain negative. Taken together, the evidence from all estimations suggests that greater innovation
delay is positively associated with greater discretionary regulatory delay, in accordance with the
prediction of the model.
Finally, note that the relationship between regulatory and innovation delay is concave (i.e., a
piecewise linear approximation of concavity) in all estimations. Figure 7 plots expected regulatory
delay as a function of innovation delay, using the spline coeﬃcients estimated in models R1—R4.31
Thus the data are in accord with the third prediction of the model, from Proposition 6.32
Summary To conclude the test of the predictions of the theoretical model, I summarize the
evidence presented with a suite of hypothesis tests in Table 7. Panel A of the table reports results
from the innovation delay estimations I1—I3. The tests are for ds/d¯ a ≤ 0, which would violate
Propositions 2 and 4. The test is implemented with the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for
the regime change are non-positive. Thus under the null, the hazard rate for innovation delay
stays the same or decreases (or, equivalently, innovation delay did not decrease) in the period when
structural regulatory delay was lower. This hypothesis is soundly rejected in all states, with the
possible exception of Illinois, for which the test rejects at the 10% level or better for I1 and I2 but
not for I3. The hypothesis that the relevant coeﬃcients are zero is also rejected at the 1% level
when the states are tested jointly.
Panel B of Table 7 reports results from the regulation delay estimations R1—R4, where the
31Mean regulatory delay is calculated as the average across the sample of the observation-speciﬁcm e a nd u r a t i o n .
Mean durations are computed from the estimated survival curves using actual covariates and the counterfactual
innovation delay shown on the x-axis in the ﬁgure.
32T h es p l i n es p e c i ﬁcation was chosen over a quadratic in innovation delay to increase robustness to outliers. If
estimations R1—R4 are repeated with a quadratic replacing the spline, the coeﬃcients on innovation delay are all
negative except for the linear term in R2, which is insigniﬁcant.
24tests are for da/ds ≤ 0, which would violate Proposition 5. The test is implemented with the null
hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for the spline in innovation delay are non-negative. Thus under the
null, the hazard rate for endogenous regulation delay stays the same or increases (or, equivalently,
regulation delay does not increase) as innovation delay increases. Although all the spline coeﬃcients
are negative, the hypothesis is not rejected for β1, the spline coeﬃcient for innovation delay less
than the median. Thus the best evidence that innovation and regulation delay move together is
found when innovation delay is longer than usual. Innovation delays become much more spread
out in the upper quartiles (e.g., the median is 35 days but the third quartile is 145 days); perhaps
unusually long delays are more eﬀective signals because they catch the eye of the regulator more.
The hypothesis that the innovation delay coeﬃcients are zero is rejected at the 5% level or better
in six out of eight cases in joint tests.
Panel C of Table 7 reports results from concavity tests for Proposition 6. The null hypothesis
here is that the relationship between regulatory delay and innovation delay is linear or convex.
Unfortunately (from the standpoint of testing the theoretical model) the estimates of the spline
coeﬃcients are not precise enough to reject the null. On the other hand, concavity would not be
rejected, either. The evidence for the third prediction from the models, while borne out visually in
Figure 7, is the weakest of the three.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a model that endogenizes innovation timing and regulatory delay. The ﬁrm
uses the timing of new product introduction to signal the marginal cost of regulatory delay to
the regulator. In the separating equilibrium, the regulator responds to the revealed information by
rewarding ﬁrms with higher marginal cost of delay with lower regulatory delay. The model generates
testable predictions, which are consistent with data on a Bell Operating Company’s operations in
four states. Perhaps the most important theoretical result, which is supported empirically, is that
25the reduction in average regulatory delay in the Ameritech states contributed toward the speedier
innovation by the ﬁrm observed in the latter half of the 1990’s. To the extent that regulatory delay
still exists in these and other jurisdictions, the additional social cost of delay from distorting the
incentive to innovate should be factored into regulators’ and legislatures’ social calculus.
One interesting implication of the model is that the unobservability of the cost of regulatory
delay to the ﬁrm beneﬁts consumers, because signaling requires the ﬁrm to speed product intro-
duction. Thus if the ﬁrm were somehow able to communicate convincingly its regulatory delay
costs to the regulator without costly signaling, so that the game switched to the full-information
version, consumers would wait longer to receive new services.
Of course, the empirical evidence does not rule out all other explanations for the observed
relationship between innovation and regulatory delay. However, external evidence suggests that
regulators are becoming increasingly attuned to the costs of regulatory delay, so that the idea that
a ﬁrm wishes the communicate such costs to the regulator is not far-fetched. Over the last decade,
regulatory commissions (in some cases prodded by state legislatures) have placed more emphasis
on the beneﬁts from new products. The older breed of regulatory oﬃcial, accustomed to tight
regulatory control and a stable industry, viewed new products with suspicion. As one regulator
put it, “...regulation of telecommunications remain essential to protect the public from deleterious
consequences of innovation...” (Oppenheim, 1991, p.310). Contrast this view with the more recent
goals adopted by regulators in the Ameritech region to “...facilitate the introduction of innovative
new services in this competitive marketplace.” (PSC of Wisconsin, 1998, p.47) This change of
attitude about the importance of new products to consumers and ﬁrms may explain why structural
r e g u l a t o r yd e l a yf e l ls om u c hi np e r i o d2 .
The theoretical model may also apply to other regulatory settings, such as the timing of patent-
ing and patent approval, or of pharmaceutical development and regulatory approval. With minor
modiﬁcations to the objective functions, the model may also apply to decision-making within a ﬁrm,
where the agents are the R&D division and management, in place of the ﬁrm and the regulator,
26respectively. In this setting consumer surplus would not enter management’s objective function. In
each of these settings, there is asymmetric information and the possibility of signaling and learning
over time.
There are some interesting extensions to the model that deserve future attention. In the current
formulation actions undertaken in one jurisdiction have no signaling value to regulators in the other
jurisdictions (apart from alerting regulators that a certain service is technologically feasible after
it is introduced in the ﬁrst state), and the ﬁrm’s decision is taken to be independent across states.
A logical next step for the model is to expand the signaling game to include multiple receivers of
the ﬁrm’s multiple signals. Whether such a model will generate predictions restrictive enough to
falsify the model remains to be seen.
Another extension would be to explicitly incorporate unregulated rivals into the model. The
only impact of competition in the current model is indirect: it may aﬀect the marginal cost of
delay to the ﬁrm (θ) or the regulator’s beneﬁts of delay (V ). Given that local telecommunications
competition was just getting oﬀ the ground during the period studied, including competition in
the model seems to be most useful for application to future data sets. Finally, exploring the
political economy of regulatory delay in the telecommunications industry would be an interesting
complement to the present work, where the regulator’s taste for delay is assumed but not derived.
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F00(s∗)−rF0(s∗) > 0, where the inequality follows because F0 < 0 and F00 > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 The marginal cost of delay to the ﬁrm is the same whether the delay
stems from the ﬁrm’s or the regulator’s choice. We can ﬁnd ∂s∗/∂θ by diﬀerentiation of (2), since
(2) holds for all θ: ∂s∗
∂θ = −
e−rbπ0(θ)
F00(s∗)−rF0(s∗) < 0, where the inequality follows from the assumptions
on F.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 The limit of da/ds as θ ↓ θ− is given by limθ↓θ− (dα/dθ)/(dσ/dθ).
Since limθ↓θ− dσ/dθ = −∞ by the discussion after equation (12), it follows that da/ds,w h i c hi s
positive by Proposition 5 tends to zero as θ falls to θ−. An increasing function with a vanishing
derivative at θ− must be concave at least in a neighborhood around θ−.
Statement and proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7 σ(θ) <τ(θ) for θ ∈ (θ−,θ+). Innovation delay is smaller under signaling than the
full information case.
From (12) we know the proposition holds in a neighborhood to the right θ−,s oi fi td o e sn o t
hold for all types σ crosses τ from below at a type ¯ θ. But then pick a type θ0 > ¯ θ such that
τ(θ0) ∈ σ([θ−,θ+]), and consider a deviation by a ﬁrm of type θ0 to τ(θ0). Then the regulator
infers (incorrectly) that the ﬁrm is of type θ00,w h e r eθ00 = σ−1(τ(θ0)).B yd e ﬁnition of τ it must
be that ˜ Π(θ0,θ0,σ(θ0)) < ˜ Π(θ0,θ0,τ(θ0)).A l s o , b e c a u s e ∂˜ Π/∂ˆ θ>0,w eh a v e˜ Π(θ0,θ0,τ(θ0)) <
˜ Π(θ0,θ00,τ(θ0)).T h u st h eﬁrm of type θ0 does better to play τ(θ0), and deviation to τ(θ−) cannot
be credibly punished. Thus σ cannot cross τ.
The Mailath conditions In addition to the assumption that ˜ Π is C2, the following conditions
are required to make use of Mailath’s (1987) results:





dˆ θ. Prop. 1 implies that
∂Π/∂b 6=0 , db/da =1 , and equation (6) implies that dα/dˆ θ 6=0 ,s o∂˜ Π/∂ˆ θ 6=0 .
2. Type monotonicity: ∂2˜ Π
∂s∂θ 6=0 . Here, ∂2˜ Π
∂s∂θ = −e−r(s+b)π0(θ) < 0.
3. Requirements of the full information strategy:
(a) Existence and uniqueness: ∂˜ Π(θ,θ,s)/∂s =0has unique solution in s, which maximizes
˜ Π(θ,θ,s). Here, ∂˜ Π
∂s =0⇒ rF(s) − F0(s)=e−rbπ(θ) as in equation (2). Under the
assumptions on F in the footnote by equation (2), a unique solution exists.
31(b) “Strict” quasiconcavity.
∂2˜ Π(θ,θ,τ(θ))
∂s2 < 0. Evaluated at (θ,θ,τ(θ)), and using equation
(2), we have ∂2˜ Π
∂s2 = e−rs(rF0(s) − F00(s)) < 0.







¯ ¯ ¯ >k . In this application this condition does not hold, because (due to the
exponential terms in s)a ss →∞ , ∂˜ Π(θ,θ,s)/∂s → 0. However, this condition is suﬃcient
but not necessary, and is stronger than needed. The condition is used in Mailath (1987)
to bound the set S ={s ∈ R|∃θ such that ˜ Π(θ,θ,s) ≥ ˜ Π(θ,θ−,τ(θ−)} for arbitrary τ.T h e
inequality condition may be written as
e−r(s−τ(θ−)) ≥
³





As s →∞ , the left side of inequality (24) goes to zero for arbitrary τ.A s s →∞ ,t h e
numerator on the right side of (24) is unaﬀected, the denominator has F(s) → 0 and
e−r(¯ a+α(θ))π(θ) > 0, and so the right side is a positive number bounded away from zero.
Thus S is bounded above as required.
5. Initial condition: equation (12). Assume not: suppose σ is one-to-one and incentive com-
patible but that σ(θ−) 6= τ(θ−). Consider a deviation by the ﬁrm of type θ− to τ(θ−) .I f
τ(θ−)=σ(θ0) for some θ0 ∈ [θ−,θ+], then the regulator will infer (incorrectly) that the ﬁrm
is of type θ0.B yd e ﬁnition of τ it must be that ˜ Π(θ−,θ−,σ(θ−)) < ˜ Π(θ−,θ−,τ(θ−)).A l s o ,
because ∂˜ Π/∂ˆ θ>0,w eh a v e˜ Π(θ−,θ−,τ(θ−)) < ˜ Π(θ−,θ0,τ(θ−)).T h u st h eﬁrm does better
to play τ(θ−). On the other hand, if τ(θ−) / ∈ σ([θ−,θ+]),t h e nas e n s i b l er e ﬁnement such
as the intuitive criterion can ensure that the regulator holds the pessimistic belief that the
ﬁrm’s type is θ−. If so, then (by deﬁnition of τ)t h eﬁrm does no worse playing τ(θ−) than
by playing σ(θ−). In either case, then, deviation to τ(θ−) cannot be credibly punished. Thus
it must be that σ(θ−)=τ(θ−).
326. Single crossing condition:
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂s
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂ˆ θ is monotonic in θ.W eh a v e
∂˜ Π(θ,ˆ θ,s)/∂s














Since neither W nor U depend on θ, the relevant terms are
¡
rF(s) − F0(s) − e−rbπ(θ)
¢
/π(θ),
which has derivative in θ of −(rF(s) − F0(s))π0(θ)/π(θ)2. This derivative has the sign of
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Figure 3: The ﬁrm’s optimal strategy for innovation delay under full and asymmetric information
34Innovation Delay Innovation Delay
Before Regulatory Change After Regulatory Change
Sample Period 1 (1991—mid 1994) Period 2 (mid 1994—1999)
State N min mean median max N min mean median max N
IL 95 0 128 34 665 34 0 45 0 503 62
IN 77 0 457 199 2605 29 0 159 45 1,318 48
OH 65 361 1,267 1,235 2,518 8 0 98 26 1,071 62
WI 106 0 357 150 2,441 40 0 100 18 1,667 66
Total 349 111 238
Table notes: ﬁgures are in days. See text for calculation of s.
Table 1: Change in Innovation Delay Between Periods
Regulatory Delay Regulatory Delay
Before Regulatory Change After Regulatory Change
Sample Period 1 (1991—mid 1994) Period 2 (mid 1994—1999)
State N min mean median max N min mean median max N
IL 97 1 36 46 48 29 1 30 16 248 68
IN 69 43 103 83 217 15 1 13 3 152 54
WI 103 2 106 44 752 25 1 9 10 48 78
Total 269 69 200
Table notes: ﬁgures are in days. Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio.
Table 2: Change in Regulatory Delay Between Periods
35Lower 95% conf. Upper 95% conf.
State Period Mean (s.e.) Median limit for median limit for median
IL 1 126.5 (32.4) 32 0 53
2 45.0 (13.1) 0 0 0
IN 1 320.7 (97.6) 106 76 221
2 133.5 (38.2) 42 28 53
OH 1 1,413.0 (309) 1,493 0 1,493
2 87.3 (23.2) 19 13 32
WI 1 356.6 (81.6) 143 77 201
2 99.5 (31.4) 19 3 23
Table notes: ﬁgures (in days) are based on survival curve estimates (see Figure 5). period 1 is 1991 to mid
1994, period 2 is thereafter.















Figure 4: The equilibrium relationship between regulatory and innovation delay
36Illinois



























































































































































































































































Figure 5: Nonparametric survival curves for innovation delay s
37Illinois






































































































































































































Figure 7: The Curvature of Mean Regulatory Delay
39Cox Proportional Hazards Models for Innovation Delay
Estimation I1 Estimation I2 Estimation I3
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
IL:reg change 0.365∗ 0.214 0.291 0.208 −0.006 0.260
IN:reg change 0.727∗∗∗ 0.277 0.710∗∗ 0.281 0.487∗∗ 0.218




Federal tariﬀ ﬁrst −0.654∗∗∗ 0.137 −0.695∗∗∗ 0.144 −0.616∗∗∗ 0.138
PCI 0.928 1.887
Access lines 0.413 0.364
Population density 0.477 0.304
Telecom patentst−1 0.409 0.413
Stratiﬁcation none by state none
N 349 349 349
χ2 statistic (d.f.) 80.9 (7) p =0 .00 63.27 (4) p =0 .00 90.70 (8) p =0 .00
T(G) statistic (d.f.) 1.57 (7) p =0 .98 1.09 (4) p =0 .99 3.17 (8) p =0 .92
Log likelihood −1,626.3 −1,172.4 −1,620.9
* = 10% level signiﬁcance; ** = 5% level signiﬁcance; *** = 1% level signiﬁcance.
Table notes: The model incorporates time-varying covariates. Larger positive coeﬃcients imply shorter
delays. Excluded state dummy is Illinois. Federal tariﬀ ﬁrst is an indicator for innovation delays calculated
from the initial date the service was ﬁled in the Federal Access Tariﬀ; other delays calculated from the date
of the ﬁrst ﬁling in a state tariﬀ (with ﬁrst state’s delay changed from 0 to 0.5). PCI is per capita personal
income in the state. Access lines is the number of access lines of Ameritech’s subscribers in the state. Telecom
patentst−1 is the one-year lagged count of patents approved in the classes relevant to telecommunications
services (359, 370, 379, and 395). χ2 statistic is for the null hypothesis that all coeﬃcients are zero. Figures in
parentheses are degrees of freedom. T(G) statistic is for a global test of the proportional hazards assumption
and has a χ2 distribution; rejection would indicate that the model is misspeciﬁed (test 4 of Grambsch and
Therneau (1994)).
Table 4: Semiparametric estimation results for innovation delay s
40Lower 95% conf. Upper 95% conf.
State Period Mean (s.e.) Median limit for median limit for median
IL 1 36.2 (3.3) 46 46 46
2 30.1 (4.7) 17 3 45
IN 1 103.4 (16.4) 83 57 120
2 13.0 (4.0) 3 3 3
WI 1 105.6 (36.9) 44 24 62
2 9.5 (0.7) 10 10 10
Table notes: ﬁgures (in days) are based on survival curve estimates (see Figure 6). period 1 is 1991 to mid
1994, period 2 is thereafter. Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio.
Table 5: Estimated regulation delay a
41Cox Proportional Hazards Models for Regulatory Delay
Estimation R1 Estimation R2 Estimation R3 Estimation R4
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
IL:reg change 0.218 0.187 0.228 0.236 0.168 0.199 0.163 0.384
IN:reg change 1.669∗∗∗ 0.292 1.957∗∗∗ 0.336 1.420∗∗∗ 0.323 1.399∗∗∗ 0.367
WI:reg change 1.855∗∗∗ 0.348 1.483∗∗∗ 0.184 1.566∗∗∗ 0.388 1.649∗∗∗ 0.449
Innovation delay = 0 −0.445 0.340 −0.527 0.395 −0.344 0.504 −0.425 0.477
∈ [1,median] -4.51E-03 0.010 -4.21E-03 0.012 -7.56E-03 0.011 −0.008 0.011
> median -3.78E-04 2.39E-04 -3.79E-04 2.79E-04 -4.86E-04∗∗ 2.08E-04 -5.16E-04∗∗ 2.08E-04
Order: second 0.149 0.361 0.080 0.331
Order: third 0.450 0.382 0.388 0.355
Order: fourth 1.047∗∗∗ 0.386 1.007∗∗∗ 0.356
PUC budget 1.577∗∗∗ 0.567 1.734 2.696
Republican −0.094 0.162 −0.230 0.243
Republican history 0.664 0.660 −0.227 1.499
Stratiﬁcation by state none by state by state
N 267 267 246 246
χ2 statistic (d.o.f.) 65.2 (6) p =0 .00 84.4 (9) p =0 .00 114.1 (9) p =0 .00 117.3 (12) p =0 .00
T(G) statistic (d.o.f.) 4.06 (6) p =0 .67 14.899 (9) p =0 .09 7.7 (9) p =0 .57 9.8 (12) p =0 .64
Log likelihood −914.2 −1,193.9 −821.1 −819.8
* = 10% level signiﬁcance; ** = 5% level signiﬁcance; *** = 1% level signiﬁcance.
Table notes: Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio. PUC budget is the log budget of the state public utility commission.
Republican is an indicator for a Republican governor and majority in both houses of the state legislature. Republican history is the average
value of Republican from 1984 to the previous year of the observation. See also notes to Table 4.




H0: βj ≤ 0 vs. HA: βj > 0
IL:reg change 0.045 0.081 0.492
IN:reg change 0.004 0.006 0.013
OH:reg change * * *
WI:reg change 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint test: H0: β =0vs. HA: β 6=0 0.000 0.000 0.001
Panel B: Evidence that discretionary regulatory delay is positively correlated with
innovation delay
Estimation Estimation Estimation Estimation
R1 R2 R3 R4
p-value p-value p-value p-value
H0: βj ≥ 0 vs. HA: βj < 0
β1 for innovation delay ∈ [1,median] 0.328 0.360 0.245 0.240
β2 for innovation delay > median 0.057 0.087 0.010 0.006
Joint test: H0: β =0vs. HA: β 6=0
β1 and β2 0.208 0.311 0.028 0.016
β1, β2,a n dβ0 for innovation delay =0 0.044 0.023 0.027 0.015
Panel C: Evidence that regulatory delay is concave in innovation delay
H0: β2 ≤ β1 vs. β2 >β 1 0.342 0.373 0.261 0.256
*None of the delay durations in Ohio are completed in the period before the change in regulatory
regime, and so ˆ β for the OH:reg change variable would be +∞ and the hypothesis test is moot.
Table notes: One-sided tests are computed with one-sided t tests. Joint tests are computed with
Wald tests.
Table 7: Hypothesis Tests of Outcomes That Would Reject the Theoretical Model
43